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1  Introduction
Latin America is a region which has been plagued with persistent problems of social 
cohesion linked to inequality (Bértola and Ocampo 2012; Fitzgerald et al. 2011; 
Huber et al. 2006; Milanovic and Muñoz de Bustillo 2008; Williamson 2010). Over 
the long term, the excessive degree of inequality in Latin America was considered 
an anomaly in international comparisons (Deininger and Squire 1996, 1998). 
However, over the last two decades, income inequality actually decreased across 
most countries in the region, though it still remains above the world average 
(ECLAC 2010; Cornia 2012). With this, Latin America has emerged as a positive 
anomaly, going against the grain of recent world trends which are heading towards 
greater inequality (Hvistendahl 2014, Ravallion 2014).
This historical shift in inequality in Latin America has attracted considerable 
research aiming to uncover the causes of this change (De la Torre 2014; Salazar 
2014; Székely 2014). Contributing to this recent literature, this chapter provides 
new knowledge about the role of fiscal policy on income redistribution in the Latin 
American context. The role of fiscal policy on income distribution has been at the 
heart of some of the most controversial economic and political discussions sur-
rounding the history of economic policy (Bastagli et al. 2012; Lindert 2004; Piketty 
2014). Today, the role of fiscal policy on income distribution remains highly perti-
nent, given the distinct positions scholars have taken about its effectiveness as a tool 
of redistribution in the Latin American context (Arroyo Abad and Lindert 2014; 
Bastagli et al. 2012; Bárcena and Kacef 2011; Goñi et al. 2011).
We use the available historical data on 18 Latin American countries for the time 
period 1960–2012 to investigate the impact of public spending and public revenues 
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on income inequality, using the Gini index. While previous studies examined the 
impact of fiscal policy on inequality using data from 1990 onwards—often using a 
smaller number of countries—our aim is to contribute to the literature by extending 
the time period to the longest possible due to data restrictions while increasing the 
number of countries under study to the maximum, 18. Given the turn in fiscal policy 
from Washington Consensus-style approaches to more progressive ones (Hausmann 
1997), and differences in the methodology used to produce the data, we split the 
time period into two subperiods, 1960–1998 and 1999–2012. Another novelty of 
this chapter is that we analyze results at the national and urban levels for this second 
subperiod, which is of interest given the high degree of urbanization in Latin 
America. We apply several econometric methods, specifications, and definitions of 
variables, based on fixed and random effects and panel-corrected standard errors. 
We test the direction and magnitude of the historical effect that fiscal policy has had 
on income distribution for the period. We examine both the impact of aggregate 
public spending and public revenues and the main functional categories of spending 
and taxation.
The rest of the chapter is divided into four sections. In Sect. 2, we present a brief 
literature review of income inequality and fiscal policy in the Latin American con-
text. In Sect. 3, we present the data and methodology. In Sect. 4, we set out the 
results of our analysis, at both the general Latin American and specific national 
levels. Section 5, concludes by presenting the main findings and their implications 
in terms of fiscal policy.
2  Inequality and Fiscal Policy in Twentieth-Century Latin 
America: A Background
In this section we firstly highlight the main contributions on income inequality, 
highlighting those with particular relevance for the Latin American context. We 
then turn to analyze the literature on the importance of fiscal policy for inequality in 
Latin America, and then set out our approach in this chapter in the context of this 
most recent literature.
2.1  Income Inequality in Latin America: A Contemporary 
Debate
Economic inequality defines in general the differences among individuals or groups 
in a given population—which may be regional, national, or international—as 
regards wealth, resources, income, or opportunities (World Bank 2006). The con-
cern about economic inequality in capitalist development was a central issue for the 
classical political economists from Adam Smith to John Stuart Mill. In contrast, 
economic inequality within and among countries became a secondary concern for 
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neoclassical economists from the last quarter of nineteenth century onwards. 
As regards income inequality in particular, one of the most influential exceptions 
was Kuznets (1953, 1955), whose studies gave support to the “inverted-U Kuznets 
hypothesis.” This hypothesis predicted a pattern of increasing income inequality in 
the early stages of economic growth, while it also predicted that at higher levels of 
economic growth, inequality would decrease. In general, from the 1950s to the 
1990s, the literature on inequality and development was divided on the validity of 
the Kuznets hypothesis. Much of the earlier literature supported the Kuznets hypoth-
esis (Milanovic 1994; Higgins and Williamson 1999; Barro 2000). However, more 
recently, scholarship identified limits to the general validity of the hypothesis 
(Deininger and Squire 1996, 1998; Atkinson 1997; Bértola 2005). In any case, until 
the 1990s, the main problem characterizing most of the attempts to verify or other-
wise test the hypothesis was associated with the attempts to identify temporal rela-
tions by means of cross-country data. A key contribution was Deininger and Squire 
(1996), which overcame this problem through the use of panel data and regional 
dummies. By introducing Latin American countries as a dummy, their results 
showed that the inverted-U Kuznets hypothesis vanished. In other words, the authors 
demonstrated that the cross-sectional results of previous works that had supported 
the Kuznets hypothesis had been biased by the relatively high level of inequality of 
the group of middle-income Latin American countries.
So, the high levels of inequality in Latin American have been considered an 
anomaly in the international patterns of income distribution. Indeed, the reduction 
of inequality in Latin America over the last few decades, along with the shift of 
some countries from low- to middle-income levels and increasing inequality levels 
among the higher income countries, has significantly flattened the Kuznets curve in 
the world economy. Despite this, with or without empirical evidence for the Kuznets 
hypothesis, many economists and politicians believed that increasing inequality was 
a necessary condition for economic growth at the earlier stages of development. 
Hence, policy efforts to reduce inequality were held to impede or reduce economic 
growth (Ravallion 2014). This assumption was reinforced by argument of the so- called 
big trade-off between equality and efficiency as predicted by Okun (1975). He 
claimed that all “societies inevitably face an invidious choice between efficient 
production and equitable wealth and income distribution.” Moreover, he stated that 
“Not only more equal distribution of incomes reduce incentives to work and invest, 
but the effort to redistribute.”1 Okun’s assumption has been influential in providing 
reasons to avoid income redistribution through fiscal policy.
Latin America constitutes a middle-income region with well-known problems of 
development and social cohesion linked to long-term inequality as regards wealth, 
income, and opportunities (Bértola and Ocampo 2012; Milanovic and Muñoz de 
Bustillo 2008; Huber et al. 2006; Sánchez-Ancochea 2014; Williamson 2010). As 
Fig. 1 shows, from the first decade of the 2000s, income inequality actually 
decreased across most countries in the region, though inequality in Latin America is 
1 This apparent trade-off between efficiency and equality has been recently challenged by IMF 
researchers (Berg and Ostry 2011; Ostry et al. 2014).
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still above the world average (ECLAC 2010, 2014; Cornia 2012; Salazar 2014). 
Indeed, Latin America now represents a positive anomaly at the international level, 
since the reduction in income inequality goes against the grain of recent trends in 
the rest of the world, which are heading towards greater inequality (Hvistendahl 
2014; Ravallion 2014).
As renewed attention around issues of inequality preoccupies scholars of social 
science, the humanities, and even science2 in the contemporary period, a central 
question is to explain why inequality is decreasing in Latin America, after decades 
of persistent inequality while, in the rest of the world, inequality is again on the rise 
(Atkinson and Piketty 2010; Milanovic 2013; OECD 2008; Piketty 2014; Piketty 
and Saez 2014).
A significant number of scholars have been attracted to the task of identifying the 
major political and economic determinants of the historical shift in income inequal-
ity in Latin America since the 2000s (Anderson and Palacio 2014; Astorga 2014; 
Cornia 2012, 2014a, b; González and Martner 2012; Lustig et al. 2013; McLeod and 
Lustig 2011; Tsounta and Osueke 2014; De la Torre 2014). Regarding the possible 
political determinants, scholars have studied in particular the effects of democracy 
and progressive government on reducing inequality (McLeod and Lustig 2011; 
Milanovic and Muñoz de Bustillo 2008; Montecino 2011). Other scholarly works 
2 See, for example, how inequality has become a key international issue among scientists, as 
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Fig. 1 Gini coefficient in Latin America, 1960–2012. Source: Elaborated by authors using data 
from Milanovic (2014)
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have focused on institutional factors such as human capital and labor market failures 
(Lustig et al. 2013; Tsounta and Osueke 2014; Irigoin and Giardili 2014). Finally, 
scholars have investigated the extent to which economic factors have determined 
reduced inequality, including foreign trade and foreign direct investment (Székely 
and Sámano-Robles 2014; Tsounta and Osueke 2014). However, much less atten-
tion has been paid to the role of fiscal policy as regards this historical shift in Latin 
America, and it is to this we now turn.
2.2  Fiscal Policy and Income Distribution in Latin America
The role of fiscal policy in income distribution has been at the heart of some of the 
most controversial economic and political discussions throughout history (Comín and 
Díaz-Fuentes 2005; Bastagli et al. 2012; Lindert 2004; Piketty 2014). This question 
has also been examined in the Latin American context (Arroyo Abad and Lindert 
2014). The question is a highly pertinent one for Latin America today. Fiscal policy 
has been held to be an important tool of redistribution in the Latin American context 
(Bárcena and Kacef 2011; González and Martner 2012; Goñi et al. 2011). Bastagli 
et al. (2012) demonstrated that, even in the context of a worldwide trend towards 
increased inequality, fiscal policy mattered. This is because the level of available 
income before and after fiscal policy (tax and transfer) shows a wide difference among 
countries due to tax incidence, tax progressivity, and social spending policies.
Despite this debate on fiscal policy and income distribution, there is a lack of 
empirical work which identifies the variables of public spending and revenue 
that affect income distribution in Latin America. Among the existing studies that 
consider fiscal policy and income distribution, Goñi et al. (2011) described the per-
formance of tax and transfers on income distribution in six Latin American coun-
tries in comparison to Western Europe at the beginning of the 2000s. This study 
concluded that the fiscal system proved weak as regards reducing income inequality 
in Latin America. Gómez Sabaini and Martner (2008) compared the Gini indices 
before and after taxes in a broad sample of Latin American countries. They found 
that fiscal policy was slightly more effective than the Goñi et al. (2011) study, but 
this finding was not significant until around 2005. More recently, Cornia (2012) 
concluded that tax, social spending, and other institutional variables were signifi-
cant factors as regards income distribution in Latin America. In a further study, 
Cornia et al. (2014) updated and confirmed their results, that is, that taxation had 
progressive effects on income distribution.
More specifically, two recent contributions sought to identify the effects of taxa-
tion and public spending on income distribution for most Latin American countries 
from the 1990s onwards. Working from the United Nations-Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), González and Martner (2012) iden-
tified a positive role of fiscal policy on income distribution, in particular social 
spending, education, public investment, and a progressive tax system, in addition to 
other institutional and macroeconomic variables. From the International Monetary 
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Fund (IMF), Tsounta and Osueke (2014) found that government policies could 
explain more than a half of the reduction in income inequality in Latin American 
countries in the first decade of the 2000s, while education spending and tax reve-
nues were the most significant identified variables of income redistribution.
Our study builds on this literature by analyzing the effects of fiscal policies on 
income distribution for different periods and 18 Latin American countries. We test 
whether public spending and public revenues and its main components determined 
income distribution for the subperiods 1960–1998 and 1999–2012. As regards pub-
lic revenues, we enquire whether the public revenue incidence had a significant 
effect on income distribution and whether each tax category had different effects on 
income distribution. It is generally assumed in the literature that typical direct taxes, 
such as personal income taxes, are more progressive in redistributive terms than 
indirect taxes, such as taxes on goods and services. However, given that there are 
other categories of direct and indirect taxes that affect income distribution, we have 
also considered the effects of property taxes and social contributions. Thus our 
derived questions are these: Which categories of taxes had more effect on income 
distribution? Did the progressiveness of the tax structure determine income distribu-
tion? It is important to state that we have not considered other variables of fiscal 
efficiency such as tax compliance, tax evasion, or horizontal exemptions which may 
also feasibly affect income distribution.
In addition, we enquired whether public spending had a significant effect on 
income inequality. Given that spending categories could have different progressive 
or regressive effects on income distribution, we examined the effects of different 
categories of public spending, including education, health, social security, and 
housing on income distribution. Our approach, therefore, to assessing public 
spending goes beyond examining only education, which is the category most com-
monly dealt with by scholars, and broadens the study to items that typically receive 
much less attention: health, social security, and housing, which may well have a 
significant effect.
As regards the evolution of public spending and public revenues in Latin 
America, as seen in Fig. 2, we observe a great heterogeneity in national fiscal poli-
cies. In some countries, such as Brazil and Ecuador, fiscal policy has assumed a 
great direct relevance while, in others, the public sector has played a more passive 
role, as in the cases of Guatemala and Paraguay. However, we can also note some 
common elements associated with the region as a whole, namely, the growth of 
both public spending and public revenues (Díaz-Fuentes and Revuelta 2011). 
Despite these increases, these variables still have less weight as a percentage of 
GDP in Latin America than do they in the average of OECD countries (ECLAC 
2014; OECD 2015). In addition, there are significant differences between Latin 
American countries and OECD members in terms of tax. Broadly speaking, in 
Latin America there is a bias towards indirect taxation while tax systems in OECD 
countries are biased towards direct taxes (ECLAC 2014; OECD 2015). Another 
important difference is that fiscal policies in Latin America are in general much 
less progressive as regards their capacity to redistribute than those in OECD coun-
tries (Amarante 2014).
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3  Data and Methodology
In order to empirically analyze the impact of fiscal policy on inequality in Latin 
America we first describe the variables used to measure inequality and fiscal policy, 
as well as the control variables. These are set out in Table 1. To measure income 
inequality we use the Gini index. The Gini index is the most common indicator used 
by scholars when analyzing income inequality from the 1960s across Latin America 
(and other regions) for extended periods. Since the aim of this chapter is to conduct 
a historical analysis including the greatest possible time period, the Gini index suits 
our study well.
Given the different sources for the estimation of the Gini index along time, 
we follow the approach as found in Milanovic (2014). This approach reduces the 
problem of temporal and international comparability through the compilation and 
standardization of a wide series of Gini coefficients based on household surveys 
from 1950,3 and thus avoids the use of other sources produced by regressions or 
 shortcuts. These remain today the best Gini indices available for international 
comparison over the long term. However, despite the fact that issues around com-
parability have been reduced, it is still desirable to use other estimations of the Gini 
index from more recent years which are derived from more homogeneous sources. 
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Fig. 2 Public spending and public revenues in Latin America, 1960–2012. Source: Elaborated by 
authors using data from ECLAC (2014) and MOxLAD (2014)
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In the case of Latin America, the ECLAC has provided data on the Gini index since 
1990.4 As this is the higher quality of the two datasets and since the turn of fiscal 
policy from Washington Consensus inspired approaches to more progressive ones 
(Hausmann 1997), we divided the sample of our analysis into two subperiods: 
1960–1998, using the Milanovic Gini standardizations, and 1999–2012, using the 
4 An alternative source to ECLAC (2014) is SEDLAC (2014). However, given the differences 
between the values of the Gini coefficients of both sources, we opt to use the ECLAC data as it 
corrects for income underreporting. According to Montecino (2011) “the key difference between 
data from SEDLAC and ECLAC is that the latter corrects for income underreporting—when 
households in an income survey underreport their true amount of income, thus biasing the mea-
surement of inequality—while the former does not. Because income underreporting is likely more 
pronounced in wealthier households, failing to adjust for underreporting is expected to lead to a 
lower and biased estimate of inequality.”
Table 1 Variable descriptions and data sources
Variable Source Description
Gini Milanovic (2014) Standardized Gini index
Gininat ECLAC (2014) National Gini index
Giniurb ECLAC (2014) Urban Gini index
PubSpe ECLAC (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Total public spending (% GDP)
PubSpeEdu ECLAC (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Public spending on education (% GDP)
PubSpeHea ECLAC (2014) Public spending on health (% GDP)
PubSpeSocSec ECLAC (2014) Public spending on social security (% GDP)
PubSpeHou ECLAC (2014) Public spending on housing (% GDP)
PubRev ECLAC (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Total public revenues (% GDP)
PubIncTax ECLAC (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Personal income taxes (% GDP)
PubPropTax ECLAC (2014) Property taxes (% GDP)
PubTaxG&S ECLAC (2014) Indirect taxes on goods and services (% GDP)
SocCont ECLAC (2014) Social contributions (% GDP)
GDPpc World Bank (2014) GDP per capita
Unemp World Bank (2014) Unemployment rate (%)
Depend World Bank (2014) Dependency rate; Pop. 65 and over/Pop. 15–64 (%)
Pop World Bank (2014) Total population
Open World Bank (2014) Openness: (Exports + imports)/GDP (%)
ToT World Bank (2014) Terms of trade
Invest World Bank (2014), 
MoXLAD (2014)
Investment (% GDP)
Inf World Bank (2014) Annual variation of GDP deflator (%)
Dem Marshall et al. (2014) Institutionalized democracy
NatRes World Bank (2014) Natural resource rents (% GDP)
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ECLAC (2014) Gini index. In this second subperiod, use of ECLAC data allows for 
the separation of inequality across the nation as a whole (Gininat) and also inequal-
ity in cities (Giniurb). We acknowledge that the Gini coefficient has some limita-
tions (Atkinson 1997), not least, because it is an index of relative concentration 
which provides synthetic information on the income distribution in a single coeffi-
cient. For example, the Gini index has been criticized on the grounds it fails to 
capture issues related to income polarization, at the top and bottom income levels. 
In addition, it does not capture all kinds of incomes, such as those related to income 
from capital. Despite these shortcomings, the advantages of using the Gini index 
as regards its availability, information, and simplicity outweigh the disadvantages. 
In addition, using the Gini index facilitates a longer term comparison, although we 
need to exercise caution as regards potential biases when interpreting results.
Turning to the dimension of fiscal policy, we consider its two principal variables, 
public spending (PubSpe) and public income or revenue (PubRev). We use both 
variables at the aggregate level as well as at the functional level, that is, social 
spending related to income redistribution, on the one hand, and to tax structure, on 
the other. Thus, public social spending is disaggregated into public spending on 
education (PubSpeEdu), health (PubSpeHea), social security (PubSpeSocSec), and 
housing (PubSpeHou). As regards revenues, we consider social contributions 
(SocCont), as well as the main components of the tax structure. These are income 
(PubIncTax), property (PubPropTax), and goods and services (PubTaxG&S). For 
the subperiod 1999–2012, we have data on all these variables, whereas for the sub-
period 1960–1998, less disaggregated data on spending and income is available.
Finally, we use a series of control variables that have been identified as potential 
determinants of inequality, income distribution, and wealth in the theoretical and 
empirical literature. Thus, we consider the logarithm of GDP per capita (lnGDPpc), 
as considered by González and Martner (2012), Huber et al. (2006), Milanovic 
(1994), McLeod and Lustig (2011), Roine et al. (2009), Tsounta and Osueke (2014), 
and Williamson (2010); unemployment rate (Unemp) as used in González and 
Martner (2012); dependency rate (Depend) as deployed in Cornia (2012) and Lee 
et al. (2013); logarithm of population (lnPop) as used by Roine et al. (2009); trade 
openness (Open) as used in Lee et al. (2013) and Roine et al. (2009); terms of inter-
national trade (ToT) by Cornia (2012), Montecino (2011), and McLeod and Lustig 
(2011); investments (Invest) as found in Lee et al. (2013); inflation (Inf) as used in 
González and Martner (2012), Montecino (2011), and McLeod and Lustig (2011); 
democratic institutions (Dem) as used in Cornia (2012) and Huber et al. (2006); and 
natural resource rents (NatRes) as utilized in Loayza et al. (2013).
To test the adequate use of these variables we estimated the correlation coefficients 
among them, and did not detect serious correlation problems that would impede 
their use, as shown in Table 2. Other variables were considered, such as life expec-
tancy or secondary enrollment rate. However, when estimating the correlations with 
the rest of the variables of the sample we observed problems of high correlation that 
could bias the estimations and invalidate them as control variables.
As regards the appropriate methodology to analyze the impact of fiscal policy on 
inequality, a review of the literature on inequality shows that most authors use OLS 
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regression in order to analyze potential determinants of inequality (González and 
Martner 2012; Lee et al. 2013; Milanovic 1994; Williamson 2010). In our case, 
since we are using an unbalanced panel, which includes a sample of 18 countries 
and 39 or 14 temporal periods, depending on the subperiod under analysis (1960–
1998 or 1999–2012), the use of OLS could produce bias in the results. We therefore 
opt to estimate a series of models which have diverse assumptions about the sample 
and are more robust. Following McLeod and Lustig (2011), Montecino (2011), and 
Tsounta and Osueke (2014), we use as basic models the panel regressions with fixed 
and random effects, depending on the result of the Hausman test. We correct for the 
presence of serial correlation and heteroskedasticity, testing these with the 
Wooldridge test and the modified Wald statistics for groupwise heteroskedasticity 
test, respectively, and correlation across panels using the panel-corrected standard 
error model, also used by Huber et al. (2006). In this way, we perform diverse 
regressions adapting the following general equation to the fixed effect, random 
effect, and panel-corrected standard error models:
 
Gini F Xitg itk itm it= + +e  
where i includes each of the 18 Latin American countries in the sample (Argentina, 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El 
Salvador, Honduras, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, 
Uruguay, and Venezuela); t is the year; g is the Gini index considered (Gini, Gininat, 
Giniurb); F is a vector that includes k fiscal variables considered (PubSpeEdu, 
PubSpeHea, PubSpeSocSec, PubSpeHou, PubIncTax, PubPropTax, PubTaxG&S, 
SocCont); and X is a vector of variables of m control variables (lnGDPpc, Unemp, 
Depend, lnPop, Open, ToT, Invest, Infl, Dem, NatRes). Estimations are performed 
separately for the subperiods 1960–1998 and 1999–2012.
4  Results
When the null hypothesis in the Hausman test is rejected we use the fixed effect 
model, using the random effect model in the other case. The rejection of the null 
hypothesis both in the Wald test for heteroskedasticity and in the Wooldridge test 
signals potential problems of heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. This makes 
it worthwhile to consider the panel-corrected standard error model.
We now focus on the results of the regressions, looking first at those obtained for 
the first subperiod, 1960–1998, as shown in Table 3. Looking across the two 
 components of fiscal policy for which we have available information—public 
spending on education and personal income taxes—we find evidence showing how 
these policies were either neutral or regressive in their effect on income distribution. 
In this subperiod, among the control variables, two in particular stand out in most of 
the estimated models. Both an aging population and increasing openness were 
found to have a regressive effect on inequality. Our results confirm the findings of 
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many scholars: in this subperiod, fiscal policy did little or nothing to reduce inequalities 
in the region. This contrasts sharply with the next subperiod, as we now explain.
Since the late 1990s, fiscal policy shifted away from Washington Consensus 
approaches towards more progressive ones. This was mainly due to two main 
changes: firstly, the coming into power of more center-left or left governments, 
starting in Venezuela in 1999, when Chávez was elected president of Venezuela, 
followed by Kirchner’s and Lula’s victory in Argentina and Brazil in 2003, the elec-
tion of Vázquez in Uruguay in 2005, and so on, and secondly, policy transfer as 
regards the dominant ideas circulating in international organizations as to best prac-
tice fiscal policy (Hausmann 1997).
Analyzing this second subperiod, spanning the years from 1999 to 2012, we find 
fiscal policy making a difference to inequality in Latin America. Our findings there-
fore confirm the findings of other scholars that a shift in policy had observable 
progressive consequences. To explore this shift in more detail, we first analyze the 
estimations of the impact of fiscal policy on income inequality at the national level, 
as presented in Table 4. Here, looking inside the functional structure of public 
spending, the evidence is mixed. We can observe that public spending on health has 
reduced inequality, but we can also see how public spending on housing has exac-
erbated inequalities further. However, when we look inside the category of tax 
structure, we can observe that several elements have contributed to inequality 
Table 3 Income distribution, public spending, and tax structure, at the national level, 18 Latin 
American countries, 1960–1998 (dependent variable: Gini)
FE PCSE FE PCSE
Constant 90.213 *** 32.759 *** 98.161 *** 23.329 ***
PubSpeEdu 0.325 0.199
PubIncTax 0.234 ** 0.141
lnGDPpc 4.524 *** −4.377 *** 1.165 −4.893 ***
Depend 1.337 *** −0.209 1.843 *** −0.114
lnPop −5.414 *** 3.195 *** −4.646 *** 3.587 ***
Open 0.078 *** 0.044 *** 0.120 *** 0.048 ***
Invest −0.179 *** −0.019 −0.054 −0.011
Inf −0.000 * 0.000 −0.000 −0.000
Dem 0.148 ** 0.016 −0.099 0.018
N 478 478 403 403
R2 0.15 0.78 0.15 0.78
F 10.94 *** 11.38 ***
Wald Chi2 78.98 *** 85.12 ***
Hausman test 69.98 *** 67.62 ***
Wald test for heteroskedasticity 3142.71 *** 754.58 ***
Wooldridge test 18.004 *** 17.077 ***
*Significant at 10 %.
**Significant at 5 %.
***Significant at 1 %
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Table 4 Income distribution, public spending, and tax structure, at the national level, 18 Latin 
American countries, 1999–2012 (dependent variable: Gininat)
FE PCSE FE PCSE
Constant −170.025 ** 26.385 *** 50.495 24.909 ***
PubSpeEdu −0.189 0.186
PubSpeHea −1.217 *** −0.706 **
PubSpeSocSec −0.161 0.230
PubSpeHou 0.391 0.784 **
PubIncTax −0.889 *** −0.500 **
PubPropTax −0.358 0.638
PubTaxG&S −0.604 ** 0.139
SocCont −0.711 ** 0.177
lnGDPpc −6.226 ** −2.456 ** −2.309 −3.043 ***
Unemp 0.202 * 0.324 *** 0.132 0.286 ***
Depend −1.808 *** −0.414 ** −1.467 *** −0.418 *
lnPop 17.541 *** 2.773 *** 2.786 3.128 ***
Open −0.094 *** 0.049 *** −0.030 0.051 ***
ToT 0.003 −0.009 −0.026 *** −0.020
Invest 0.029 −0.118 0.190 *** −0.030
Inf 0.013 −0.026 −0.039 * −0.040 **
Dem −0.089 0.283 0.184 0.403 **
NatRes −0.055 −0.072 0.101 *** −0.025
N 175 175 210 210
R2 0.90 0.98 0.78 0.98
F 18.63 *** 22.58 ***
Wald Chi2 220,286.98 *** 182,262.42 ***
Hausman test 28.68 *** 25.30 **
Wald test for 
heteroskedasticity
87.65 *** 57.16 ***
Wooldridge test 38.589 *** 29.571 ***
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
reduction. Personal income taxes, social contributions, and taxes on goods and 
services are all observed to act progressively on inequality. Overall, we observe 
how public revenues contribute more to reducing inequality than public spending.
We now focus on the determinants of inequality at the urban level. Table 5 pres-
ents the results of our analysis which tracks the evolution of the impact of fiscal 
policies on the Gini index in urban zones in Latin America. We first look inside the 
functional components of public spending, and observe how public spending on 
urban health reduces inequality. In contrast, we observe that spending on urban 
housing and social security is regressive. We then turn to looking inside the func-
tional components of the tax structure, and find that personal income taxes, social 
contributions, and taxes on goods and services help reduce urban inequality. 
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Table 5 Income distribution, public spending, and tax structure, urban level, 18 Latin American 
countries, 1999–2012 (dependent variable: Giniurb)
RE PCSE RE PCSE
Constant 25.057 ** 34.862 *** 27.113 ** 18.877 **
PubSpeEdu 0.153 −0.012
PubSpeHea −1.728 *** −0.995 ***
PubSpeSocSec −0.119 0.390 ***
PubSpeHou 0.655 * 0.464
PubIncTax −1.070 *** −0.516 **
PubPropTax 0.947 * 0.135
PubTaxG&S −0.914 *** −0.152
SocCont −0.995 *** −0.294
lnGDPpc −0.572 −0.704 0.686 −1.652 **
Unemp 0.309 *** 0.491 *** 0.309 *** 0.418 ***
Depend −0.297 −0.443 *** −0.292 −0.080
lnPop 2.687 ** 1.563 *** 1.932 2.797 ***
Open −0.041 ** 0.003 −0.029 * 0.017
ToT −0.035 *** −0.029 * −0.039 *** −0.022
Invest −0.088 −0.091 0.199 *** 0.003
Inf 0.011 0.009 0.014 0.005
Dem −0.108 0.124 −0.040 0.109
NatRes −0.027 0.041 0.066 * 0.028
N 186 186 218 218
R2 0.88 0.98 0.87 0.98
Wald Chi2 833.22 *** 229,528.65 *** 1105.03 *** 166,914.20 ***
Hausman test 7.35 11.06
Wald test for 
heteroskedasticity
201.77 *** 61.39 ***
Wooldridge test 46.167 *** 19.500 ***
*Significant at 10 %
**Significant at 5 %
***Significant at 1 %
However, we find property taxes are regressive. In general terms, tax structure is 
more progressive than public spending in terms of reducing inequality.
It is illuminating to compare the effects of fiscal policy on inequality at the 
national level with those acting in the urban context, since the performance of a 
given policy may have a varying effect depending on the context. For example, fiscal 
policy that may not be observed to influence inequality at the national level may 
well do so at the urban level, with important practical consequences for policy mak-
ers. When we do so, we find some evidence of differential effects of fiscal policy 
according to its context. First, some fiscal policy which is important at the national 
level proves to be even more significant in urban areas. Here we have the case of 
public spending on health, personal income taxes, taxes on goods and services, and 
social contributions. These were significant factors in reducing inequality at the 
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national level, but had an even more intense effect at the urban level. In the opposite 
direction, public spending on housing, which was found to be regressive in urban areas, 
was even more intensely regressive at the national level. Then, we observe some poli-
cies which are important in determining inequality in urban regions, but they are not 
significant at the national level. Here, public spending on social security and property 
taxes show a regressive effect in urban areas, but not at the national level.
As regards the control variables in this subperiod, population size and unemploy-
ment rate are related to more inequality at both the national and urban scales. The 
rest of the control variables are influential at different scales. For example, increases 
in the dependency rate and GDP per capita reduce inequality at the national level. 
Meanwhile, increases in openness and terms of trade reduce urban inequality.
When calculating the interaction effect between the estimated coefficient and 
public spending and revenue levels for each Latin American country, we observe 
important national differences. As regards public spending on health, we find that 
this is most progressive in Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay, while it is least progres-
sive in Bolivia, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic. For personal income 
taxes, Brazil, Peru, and Chile stand out for achieving the highest degrees of progres-
sivity while, in contrast, Paraguay, Guatemala, and the Dominican Republic are the 
countries with the lowest progressive effect. Regarding social contributions, Brazil, 
Argentina, Costa Rica, and Venezuela led the way in the region, while the Dominican 
Republic, Venezuela, and Chile exhibited the lowest range of progressivity using 
this tool. Finally, as regards public spending on housing, which we generally found 
to be regressive, Guatemala, Brazil, and Costa Rica were those countries with a 
highest regressive effect.
5  Conclusions
This chapter sought to enquire whether fiscal policy impacted upon inequality in 
Latin America from 1960 to 2012. One of the aims of this chapter was to extend the 
number of Latin American countries included in our sample to the longest time 
period possible, given data availability. Given the shift in fiscal policy to progressive 
approaches and the differences in the methodology used to produce the data, we 
split the time period into two subperiods, 1960–1998 and 1999–2012. In this second 
subperiod, we analyzed the effects of fiscal policy on income inequality at the 
national and urban levels, to produce new knowledge about the potentially differen-
tial effects of fiscal policy. Our chapter also contributes to knowing more about the 
role of fiscal policy in the region by disaggregating fiscal policy into subcompo-
nents, both for public spending and for public revenue. Our results clearly show that 
fiscal policy was much more influential on inequality in the second subperiod than 
the first. Our main findings are the following.
For the subperiod 1960–1998, fiscal policy in general seemed to have either a 
regressive or nonsignificant relationship with inequality. Moreover, when some of 
its components were associated with inequality, this was in the direction of increasing 
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income inequality. For example personal income taxes, which could potentially be 
implemented in order to increase income redistribution and level equal, were asso-
ciated with actually increasing income inequality in this earlier period.
This contrasts sharply with our findings in the second period, from late 1990s, 
where we find that fiscal policy significantly reduced regional inequality. Disaggregating 
fiscal policy into its two main components, public spending and public revenues, 
we find that both have a significant and positive effect on inequality reduction. Overall, 
the effect of public revenues on inequality was more significant than that of public 
spending. The most significant components of public revenues and public spending to 
contribute to reducing inequality at the national level were spending on health, personal 
income taxes, taxes on goods and services, and social contributions.
When contrasting analysis across the national and urban levels, we found that 
most of the fiscal instruments under analysis had a much more intense effect at the 
urban than the national level. This means that it is the Latin American urban areas 
which are most seeing the benefits of fiscal policy on income inequality, rather than 
the rural areas. Of particular importance in decreasing inequality at the urban level 
are personal income taxes, taxes on goods and services, social contributions, and 
public spending on health. In contrast, public spending on housing, found regressive 
in urban areas, was even more intensely regressive at the national level. Certain fis-
cal policies show significant effects in urban areas but they are not significant at the 
national level. This is the case of public spending on social security and property 
taxes, which were found to be regressive only in urban areas.
In addition, there are some interesting national differences as regards fiscal 
reform and policy transfers across the region. Broadly speaking, some governments 
have taken strides to deepen income tax reform, including the implementation of 
property taxes, leading to an increased tax incidence, and in turn to greater equality. 
Other governments, however, have proved unwilling or unable to implement real 
reform. To take two extreme cases, the Brazilian Government has successfully 
implemented many progressive taxation reforms, particularly income tax. The other 
extreme is found in the Guatemalan Government, which has proved reluctant to take 
on tax reform; in consequence, inequality levels have failed to decline significantly. 
Further research is required to unravel and evaluate the varieties of fiscal reform 
across countries.
Our chapter shows showed that fiscal policy in Latin America has played an 
essential role in reducing inequality. Moreover, further extension of fiscal policy has 
a huge potential. Fiscal policies—in particular tax reforms—in Latin America have 
embarked on a path of convergence with OECD members, similar to what occurred 
in Spain and Portugal from the 1980s onwards (Díaz Fuentes 1994; Comín and 
Díaz-Fuentes 2005; Díaz-Fuentes and Revuelta 2013). It is interesting to reflect on 
the extent to which there may be a process of international policy transfer going on 
in this field. For example, the OECD is currently expanding to emerging countries, 
now comprises two Latin American countries—Mexico and Chile—and has two 
candidates—Colombia and Costa Rica (Clifton and Díaz-Fuentes 2014). Even 
though there are still differences as regards the tax burden, this amounts to an aver-
age of 34 % in OECD members in 2012 (OECD 2015), and only 25 % in Latin 
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America in the same year (ECLAC 2014), this is to be expected given the different 
levels of GDP per capita by region. The same could be said of the differences in the 
relative weight in favor of direct taxes in the OECD countries and indirect taxes in 
Latin America.
Coinciding with other recent studies, this chapter offers clear empirical evidence 
that certain fiscal policies have significantly contributed to reducing income inequali-
ties in the region. For example, increases in tax incidence and public spending in 
general, and reforms of personal income tax, social contributions, and public spending 
on health, have clearly contributed to diminishing income inequality. Given we found 
that direct taxation was more strongly associated with reducing inequality than indi-
rect taxation, an interesting policy option is to encourage governments to increase 
direct over indirect taxation. This could be a high-impact policy to reduce income 
inequality, considering that the ratio of indirect to direct taxation in the region was 
1.76 in 2012 (ECLAC 2014). This therefore provides solid evidence which can be 
used to support future fiscal reform by governments committed to further reducing 
inequality in the region. Clearly, the redistributive effect will also depend on the effi-
ciencies of tax compliance and public spending (Comín and Díaz- Fuentes 2005).
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